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The auxiliary problem principle allows solving a given equilibrium problem (EP) through
an equivalent auxiliary problem with better properties. The paper investigates two families
of auxiliary EPs: the classical auxiliary problems, in which a regularizing term is added to
the equilibrium bifunction, and the regularized Minty EPs. The conditions that ensure the
equivalence of a given EP with each of these auxiliary problems are investigated exploiting
parametric definitions of different kinds of convexity and monotonicity. This analysis leads to
extending some known results for variational inequalities and linear EPs to the general case
together with new equivalences. Stationarity and convexity properties of gap functions are
investigated as well in this framework. Moreover, both new results on the existence of a unique
of solution and new error bounds based on gap functions with good convexity properties are
obtained under weak quasimonotonicity or weak concavity assumptions.
Keywords: Equilibrium problem; auxiliary problem; Minty equilibrium problem; gap
function; error bound.
AMS Subject Classification: 90C33; 47H05; 26B25; 90C30.
1. Introduction
In computational optimization solving a given problem through a family of auxil-
iary problems, which enjoy better properties and are therefore easier to be solved,
is a widespread approach. Among others, penalty and proximal point algorithms
for nonlinear programs (see, for instance, [1, 2]) fall within this scheme. A quite
general auxiliary principle has been developed in [3, 4] within the framework of
decomposition and coordination algorithms, and it provides sufficient conditions
for an optimal solution of one suitable auxiliary problem to solve the given prob-
lem. This principle was later extended to variational inequalities [5], while the full
equivalence with the auxiliary variational inequality was investigated in [6] and ex-
ploited to develop solution methods through optimization techniques, for instance,
in [6–8]. Quite recently this kind of approach has been considered also for more
general equilibrium problems (see [9–12]), which include optimization, variational
inequalities, saddle point problems and Nash equilibria in noncooperative games
as particular cases.
In this paper we aim at deepening the analysis of auxiliary principles for equilibria
and we focus on the well-known format (see [13–15]) of an equilibrium problem
find x∗ ∈ C s.t. f(x∗, y) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ C, (EP)
where C ⊆ Rn is a nonempty, closed and convex set and the equilibrium bifunction
∗Corresponding author. Email: mauro.passacantando@unipi.it
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f : Rn × Rn → R satisfies f(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ Rn. Given any α ∈ R and the
corresponding bifunction
fα(x, y) := f(x, y) + α ‖y − x‖2/2,
the “classical” auxiliary equilibrium problem
find x∗ ∈ C s.t. fα(x∗, y) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ C, (EPα)
and the so-called Minty equilibrium problem
find x∗ ∈ C s.t. fα(y, x∗) ≤ 0, ∀ y ∈ C (MEPα)
will be considered.
It is well-known that (EPα) is equivalent to (EP ), in the sense that their solution
sets coincide, whenever α > 0 and f(x, ·) is convex [12]. Auxiliary problems (EPα)
with α > 0 have been exploited to reformulate (EP ) as an equivalent optimiza-
tion problem through smooth gap functions and to develop corresponding descent
methods (see, for instance [7, 8, 10, 11, 16]).
On the other hand, the Minty equilibrium problem (MEPα) with α = 0 has
been extensively used as an auxiliary problem for (EP ) both to obtain existence
results (see, for instance, [17–20]) and within algorithmic frameworks (see, for in-
stance, [21–25]). On the contrary, the whole class of problems (MEPα) has been
considered only for variational inequalities in [6, 26–28] and very recently, with
α < 0, in [29] to refine some existence results for equilibrium problems.
The goal of the paper is to analyse in details the conditions that guarantee the
equivalence between (EP ) and each of the above auxiliary problems together with
the properties and advantages that each equivalence brings. A rather novel feature
is the analysis of (EPα) with α < 0 which, up to now, has been considered only for
the so-called linear equilibrium problem in [27]. Furthermore, a systematic analysis
of (MEPα) allows achieving new equivalence results also for α > 0.
Section 2 explores the connections between the convexity and monotonicity prop-
erties of the bifunctions f and fα. Section 3 and Section 4 investigate the relation-
ships of (EP ) with (EPα) and (MEPα), respectively, and the properties of the
corresponding gap functions, which allow reformulating the equilibrium problems
as optimization programs. Exploiting suitable values for α, also new results on the
existence of a unique solution, stationarity properties of gap functions and error
bounds are achieved under weak monotonicity or weak concavity assumptions on f .
2. Convexity and monotonicity
Both convexity and monotonicity play an important role in the study of equilib-
rium problems and in the development of solution methods. In order to analyse
strong and weak concepts in a unified way, suitable parametric definitions can be
introduced.
Definition 1 Given γ ∈ R, a function g : Rn → R is called γ-convex on C if any
u, v ∈ C and t ∈ [0, 1] satisfy
g(t u+ (1− t) v) ≤ t g(u) + (1− t) g(v)− γ
2
t (1− t) ‖u− v‖2.
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If γ = 0, the above inequality provides the usual definition of a convex function. If
γ > 0, the inequality is strengthened and f is also called strongly convex ; similarly,
f is called weakly convex if γ < 0. Indeed, g is γ-convex on C if and only if
g(x)− γ ‖x‖2/2 is convex on C (see [30]).
In the paper the following concepts of generalized convexity notions will be ex-
ploited as well.
Definition 2 A function g : Rn → R is called quasiconvex on C if any u, v ∈ C
and t ∈ [0, 1] satisfy
g(t u+ (1− t) v) ≤ max{g(u), g(v)}.
Definition 3 A function g : Rn → R is called explicitly quasiconvex on C if it is
quasiconvex on C and
g(t u+ (1− t) v) < max{g(u), g(v)}
holds for any u, v ∈ C with g(u) 6= g(v) and any t ∈ (0, 1).
A function g : Rn → R is called γ-concave on C if −g is γ-convex on C. Quasi-
concavity and explicit quasiconcavity are defined accordingly.
Notice that γ-convexity is stronger than explicit quasiconvexity if γ ≥ 0, while
they are not related if γ < 0 as the following example shows.
Example 1 Let n = 1 and γ < 0. The function g(x) = γ x2/2 is γ-convex but it is
not (explicitly) quasiconvex on R. Furthermore, g(x) = x3 is explicitly quasiconvex
on R since it is monotone increasing, but it is not γ-convex on R since the function
x3 − γ x2/2 is not convex on (−∞, γ/6).
Any γ-convex function on Rn is continuous for any γ ∈ R, while it is well-known
that a quasiconvex function is not necessarily continuous. In the paper the following
weaker concept of continuity will be used as well.
Definition 4 A function g : Rn → R is called lower hemicontinuous on C if any
u, v ∈ C satisfy
g(v) ≤ lim inf
t→0+
g(t u+ (1− t) v);
g is called upper hemicontinuous on C if −g is lower hemicontinuous on C.
Notice that a quasiconvex function is not necessarily lower hemicontinuous: for
instance, take n = 1 and consider
g(x) =
{
0, if x < 0
1, if x ≥ 0.
Clearly, g is quasiconvex on R but is not lower hemicontinuous at x = 0.
In this paper the concepts of lower and upper hemicontinuity will be used for
the sake of simplicity. However, some results which will be shown in the following
sections could be proved also under slightly weaker assumptions as upper sign-
continuity (see, for instance, [18]) or upper sign-property (see [29]).
Definition 5 Given µ ∈ R, the bifunction f is called
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• µ-monotone on C if any x, y ∈ C satisfy the inequality
f(x, y) + f(y, x) ≤ −µ ‖y − x‖2;
• µ-pseudomonotone on C if any x, y ∈ C satisfy the implication
f(x, y) ≥ 0 =⇒ f(y, x) ≤ −µ ‖y − x‖2;
• µ-quasimonotone on C if any x, y ∈ C satisfy the implication
f(x, y) > 0 =⇒ f(y, x) ≤ −µ ‖y − x‖2.
Clearly, µ-monotonicity implies µ-pseudomonotonicity, which in turn implies µ-
quasimonotonicity. If µ = 0, the well-known concepts of monotonicity, pseudomono-
tonicity and quasimonotonicity are recovered (see [14, 18, 31, 32]). If µ > 0, the
requirements are strengthened and the strong counterparts of the above monotonic-
ity concepts defined: strong monotonicity has been often exploited in algorithmic
frameworks (see [13]) while strong pseudomonotonicity has been considered mainly
for variational inequalities (see [33, 34]) and only very recently for more general
equilibrium problems [35]. Similarly, if µ < 0 weaker concepts are introduced: weak
monotonicity has been exploited in a few papers [36–39], while, to the best of our
knowledge, weak quasimonotonicity has been used only in [29] to prove existence
results for (EP ).
The auxiliary bifunction fα inherits convexity and monotonicity properties from
f in the following way.
Proposition 2.1 (Convexity and monotonicity properties of fα).
Suppose that f : Rn × Rn → R satisfies f(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ Rn and C ⊆ Rn is
a nonempty, closed and convex set. Let x, y ∈ C and τ, γ, µ ∈ R.
a) If f(x, ·) is τ -convex, then fα(x, ·) is (τ + α)-convex for any α ∈ R.
b) If f(·, y) is γ-concave, then fα(·, y) is (γ − α)-concave for any α ∈ R.
c) If f is µ-monotone on C, then fα is (µ− α)-monotone on C for any α ∈ R.
d) If f is µ-quasimonotone on C, then fα is (−α/2)-pseudomonotone on C for
any α < 2µ.
Proof.
a),b) Since α ‖y−x‖2/2 is α-convex, they follow directly from [30, Proposition 4.1].
c) fα(x, y) + fα(y, x) = f(x, y) + f(y, x) + α‖y − x‖2 ≤ (α− µ)‖y − x‖2.
d) Take any x, y ∈ C with x 6= y such that fα(x, y) ≥ 0. Then,
f(x, y) ≥ −α ‖y − x‖2/2 > −µ ‖y − x‖2
implies f(y, x) ≤ 0 since f is µ-quasimonotone on C. Hence, the thesis follows
immediately since fα(y, x) = f(y, x) + α ‖y − x‖2/2 ≤ α ‖y − x‖2/2.
The choice of α should be aimed at getting a function fα which satisfies better
properties than f . Anyway, there is some kind of tradeoff between convexity and
monotonicity/concavity. Indeed, if α > 0, then fα(x, ·) satisfies a stronger convex-
ity condition than f(x, ·) but f has stronger monotonicity properties than fα and
f(·, y) stronger concavity properties than fα(·, y). Vice versa, if α < 0, then f(x, ·)
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satisfies a stronger convexity condition than fα(x, ·) while fα has stronger mono-
tonicity properties than f and fα(·, y) stronger concavity properties than f(·, y).
For example, consider the case in which f is monotone and f(x, ·) is convex: fα is
just weakly monotone but fα(x, ·) is strongly convex if α > 0, while fα is strongly
monotone but fα(x, ·) is just weakly convex if α < 0. This tradeoff between con-
vexity and monotonicity/concavity properties is summarised in Table 1.
Table 1. Tradeoff between convexity and mono-
tonicity/concavity properties of fα with respect
to f .
α > 0 α < 0
convexity of fα(x, ·) better worse
concavity of fα(·, y) worse better
(quasi)monotonicity of fα worse better
Notice that if f is quasimonotone, then Proposition 2.1 guarantees that fα is
strongly pseudomonotone if α < 0, but it is not necessarily weakly monotone, as
the following example shows.
Example 2 Consider n = 1, f(x, y) = (x2 + 1) (y−x) and C = (−∞, 0]. Clearly, f
is 0-quasimonotone since f(x, y) > 0 implies y > x and thus f(y, x) < 0. However,
both f and fα are not µ-monotone for any µ ∈ R since
[fα(x, y) + fα(y, x)]/(y − x)2 = −(x+ y − α)→ +∞
as x→ −∞ and y → −∞ with x 6= y.
Furthermore, notice that if f(x, ·) is (−α)-convex, then fα(x, ·) is convex and
thus explicitly quasiconvex, while the (explicit) quasiconvexity of f(x, ·) does not
imply necessarily the (explicit) quasiconvexity of fα(x, ·) even if α > 0, as the
following example shows.
Example 3 Let n = 1, f(x, y) = (y − x)3/3 and C = R. The function f(x, ·)
is explicitly quasiconvex for any x ∈ R since it is monotone increasing. However,
taking α > 0, fα(x, ·) admits a local maximum at x − α, a local minimum at x,
and limy→±∞ fα(x, y) = ±∞. Hence, fα(x, ·) is not quasiconvex since its sublevel
sets are not convex.
3. Classical auxiliary problems
The exploitation of (EPα) as an auxiliary problem is rooted in proximal point algo-
rithms for nonlinear optimization. At first it has been often used in the framework
of variational inequalities and afterwards also for other equilibrium problems (see,
for instance, Section 3.1 in [13] and the references therein).
The relationships between the solution sets S(f) and Sα(f) of (EP ) and (EPα)
are analysed considering the cases α > 0 and α < 0 separately. The analysis involves
the solution set Mα(f) of the Minty equilibrium problem (MEPα) as a tool.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose that f : Rn × Rn → R satisfies f(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ Rn
and C ⊆ Rn is a nonempty, closed and convex set. Let α > 0.
a) S(f) ⊆ Sα(f);
5
July 19, 2016 Optimization Bigi-Passacantando-revision2
b) Sα(f) ⊆ S(f) if any of the following conditions hold:
i) f(x, ·) is convex for any x ∈ C;
ii) f(x, ·) is explicitly quasiconvex and lower hemicontinuous for any x ∈ C
and f(·, y) is concave for any y ∈ C.
Proof.
a) It is obvious since fα ≥ f .
b) Suppose i) holds. Since f(x, ·) and fα(x, ·) are convex for any x ∈ C, the following
equivalences hold:
x∗ solves (EP )⇐⇒ x∗ ∈ arg min{ f(x∗, y) : y ∈ C }
⇐⇒ ∃ g∗ ∈ ∂yf(x∗, x∗) s.t. 〈g∗, y − x∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ C
⇐⇒ ∃ g∗ ∈ ∂yfα(x∗, x∗) s.t. 〈g∗, y − x∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ C
⇐⇒ x∗ ∈ arg min{ fα(x∗, y) : y ∈ C }
⇐⇒ x∗ solves (EPα),
where ∂yf(x
∗, x∗) denotes the subdifferential of the convex function f(x∗, ·) at
x∗. The first and the last equivalence are obvious consequences of the definition
of (EP ) as f(x, x) = 0 for any x ∈ C, while the second and the fourth are the
optimality conditions of convex programming. Finally, the third equivalence is due
to the equality ∂yfα(x, y) = ∂yf(x, y) + α(y − x) (see [41, Theorem 4.1.1]).
Now suppose ii) holds. Considering the bifunction fˆ(x, y) := −f(y, x), clearly
Sα(f) = M−α(fˆ) holds by definition. Moreover, fˆ satisfies the assumptions of
Theorem 2 in [29], hence M−α(fˆ) ⊆ S(fˆ). On the other hand, S(fˆ) = M0(f) holds
as well. Finally, M0(f) ⊆ S(f) follows since f satisfies the assumptions of Theorem
1 in [29].
Notice that the second inclusion of Theorem 3.1, i.e., Sα(f) ⊆ S(f), does not
hold under the quasiconvexity of f(x, ·) only as the following example shows.
Example 4 Let n = 1, f(x, y) = y3 − x3, C = [−ε,+∞) with ε > 0 and α ≥ 2 ε.
The function f(x, ·) is quasiconvex but not convex for any x ∈ C. Furthermore,
x = 0 solves (EPα) since
fα(0, y) = y
3 + α y2/2 = y2 (y + α/2) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ C,
but it does not solve (EP ) since f(0, y) < 0 for any y < 0. Therefore, the inclusion
Sα(f) ⊆ S(f) does not hold. Notice that S(f) is nonempty since x = −ε solves
(EP ):
f(−ε, y) = y3 + ε3 ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ C.
Theorem 3.2 Suppose that f : Rn × Rn → R satisfies f(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ Rn
and C ⊆ Rn is a nonempty, closed and convex set. Let α < 0.
a) Sα(f) ⊆ S(f);
b) S(f) ⊆ Sα(f) if any of the following conditions hold:
i) f(x, ·) is (−α)-convex for any x ∈ C;
ii) fα(x, ·) is explicitly quasiconvex and lower hemicontinuous for any x ∈
C and f(·, y) is explicitly quasiconcave and upper hemicontinuous for
any y ∈ C.
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Proof.
a) It is obvious since f ≥ fα.
b) If i) holds, then the proof is the same as of the first part of Theorem 3.1 b).
Now suppose ii) holds. Notice that the bifunction fˆ(x, y) := −f(y, x) and fα
satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 1 in [29], hence the following chain of inclusions
S(f) = M0(fˆ) ⊆ S(fˆ) = M0(f) ⊆Mα(f) ⊆ Sα(f).
follows
The second inclusion of Theorem 3.2, i.e., S(f) ⊆ Sα(f), does not hold supposing
f(x, ·) to be affine but not strongly convex as the following example shows.
Example 5 Let f(x, y) = ε x (x − y) with ε > 0, C = [0, 1] and α ∈ [−2 ε, 0). For
any x ∈ C the function f(x, ·) is affine but not strongly convex. Furthermore, it is
easy to check that x = 0 solves (EP ); however it does not solve (EPα) since
fα(0, y) = α y
2/2 < 0, ∀ y ∈ (0, 1].
Therefore, the inclusion S(f) ⊆ Sα(f) does not hold. Notice that Sα(f) is nonempty
because x = 1 solves (EPα):
fα(1, y) = ε (1− y) + α (1− y)2/2 = (1− y) [ε+ α (1− y)/2] ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ [0, 1].
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 allow achieving the following auxiliary problem principle.
Corollary 3.3 (Classical auxiliary problem principle).
Suppose that f : Rn×Rn → R satisfies f(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ Rn and C ⊆ Rn is a
nonempty, closed and convex set. If there exists τ ≥ 0 such that f(x, ·) is τ -convex
for any x ∈ C, then S(f) = Sα(f) for any α ≥ −τ .
If τ = 0, then the above principle collapses to the well-known one given by Lemma
3.1 in [12], while it has been considered with τ > 0 only for linear equilibrium
problems [27, Lemma 5].
Notice that variational inequalities, that is (EP ) with
f(x, y) = 〈F (x), y − x〉
for some mapping F : Rn → Rn, satisfy the assumption of Corollary 3.3 only for
τ = 0, while the so-called linear equilibrium problems (see [27]), that is (EP ) with
f(x, y) = 〈Px+Qy + r, y − x〉 (1)
for some r ∈ Rn and some P,Q ∈ Rn×n, with Q positive semidefinite, satisfy the
assumption of Corollary 3.3 with τ equal to the minimum eigenvalue of Q + QT .
Nash equilibrium problems, in which each player i selects one strategy from the
set Ci ⊆ Rni to minimize a cost function ci : C1×· · ·×CN → R, that is (EP ) with
C = C1 × · · · × CN and
f(x, y) =
N∑
i=1
[ci(x−i, yi)− ci(x))]
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where yi ∈ Ci and (x−i, yi) ∈ C, satisfy the assumption of Corollary 3.3 with
τ = min{τi : i = 1, . . . , N} for τi’s such that ci(x−i, ·) is a τi-convex function on
Ci.
The auxiliary problem principle of Corollary 3.3 can be exploited to guarantee
the existence of a unique solution for (EP ), relying on appropriate values of α.
Corollary 3.4 (Existence of a unique solution).
Suppose that C ⊆ Rn is a nonempty, closed and convex set, f : Rn × Rn → R
satisfies f(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ Rn, f(·, y) is upper hemicontinuous on C for any
y ∈ C and there exists τ ≥ 0 such that f(x, ·) is τ -convex for any x ∈ C. If any of
the following conditions holds:
a) f is µ-monotone on C with µ > −τ ,
b) f is µ-quasimonotone on C with µ > −τ/2 and τ > 0,
then there exists a unique solution of (EP).
Proof. By Corollary 3.3 it is enough to prove the thesis for (EP−τ ). Proposition 2.1
guarantees that f−τ (x, ·) is convex. Furthermore, f−τ is strongly pseudomonotone
on C since it is (µ + τ)-monotone (in case a)) or (τ/2)-pseudomonotone (in case
b)). Therefore, (EP−τ ) has a unique solution by Proposition 1 in [35].
If τ = 0, then case a) collapses into the well-known existence and uniqueness
result that exploits the strong monotonicity of f (see, for instance, [13]). It is worth
noting that the weak quasimonotonicity of f is enough to guarantee the existence
of a unique solution of (EP ) if τ > 0. Notice that the weak quasimonotonicity of f ,
together with additional assumptions, has been exploited also in [29] to obtain the
existence of solutions of (EP ) but the results of [29] do not guarantee uniqueness.
Notice that part a) of Corollary 3.4, involving µ-monotonicity of f (with τ > 0
and µ < 0), is not a special case of part b) which deals with µ-quasimonotonicity
(with µ < 0). Indeed, there are cases in which f is µ-monotone but not (µ/2)-
quasimonotone just like the following example.
Example 6 Consider n = 1, f(x, y) = y2 − x y and C = R. The function f(x, ·) is
τ -convex with τ = 2 for any x ∈ C and f is µ-monotone with µ = −1 since
f(x, y) + f(y, x) = (y − x)2.
Hence, Corollary 3.4 a) guarantees (EP ) to have a unique solution. However, f is
not µ-quasimonotone for any µ > −1. In fact, choosing x < µ and y = µ + 1 we
get
f(x, y) = y (y − x) = (µ+ 1) (µ+ 1− x) > 0,
but
f(y, x) + µ (y − x)2 = (y − x) [µ (y − x)− x] = (µ+ 1− x) (µ+ 1) (µ− x) > 0.
Therefore, Corollary 3.4 b) cannot be applied.
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3.1. Gap functions
Equilibrium problems can be reformulated as optimization programs through suit-
able gap functions. Indeed, whenever f(x, ·) is convex, the value function
ϕα(x) := sup{ −fα(x, y) : y ∈ C }
is a gap function for (EP ) for any given α ≥ 0, i.e., ϕα is non-negative on C and x∗
solves (EP ) if and only if x∗ ∈ C and ϕα(x∗) = 0 (see, for instance, [10, 11, 16]).
The auxiliary problem principle given by Corollary 3.3 allows extending this
reformulation of equilibria for suitable negative values of α if f(x, ·) is τ -convex
with τ > 0.
Theorem 3.5 (Properties of ϕα).
Suppose that C ⊆ Rn is a nonempty, closed and convex set, f : Rn × Rn → R
satisfies f(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ Rn and there exists τ ≥ 0 such that f(x, ·) is
τ -convex for any x ∈ C.
a) ϕα is a gap function for (EP ) for any α ≥ −τ .
b) ϕα(x) < +∞ for any x ∈ C and α > −τ .
c) If f is continuously differentiable on C × C, then ϕα is continuously differ-
entiable on C for any α > −τ and
∇ϕα(x) = −∇xf(x, yα(x))− α (x− yα(x)),
where yα(x) = arg max{ −fα(x, y) : y ∈ C }.
d) If there exists γ ∈ R such that f(·, y) is γ-concave on C for any y ∈ C, then
ϕα is (γ − α)-convex on C for any α ∈ R.
Proof.
a) It follows directly from Corollary 3.3.
b) Since α > −τ , −fα(x, ·) is strongly concave by Proposition 2.1. Hence, its
maximum value over C, that is ϕα(x), is finite.
c) Since −fα(x, ·) is strongly concave, it admits a unique maximizer yα(x) over C.
The thesis follows from the Danskin’s Theorem [40].
d) Since α ‖y − x‖2/2 is (−α)-concave on C for any y ∈ C, fα(·, y) is (γ − α)-
concave on C by Proposition 2.1. As it is the pointwise supremum of a family
of (γ − α)-convex functions, the gap function ϕα is (γ − α)-convex on C as well
(see [30, Proposition 4.1]).
Notice that it is more likely for ϕα to be convex if α < 0: for instance, whenever
f(·, y) is weakly concave or concave on C, that is γ ≤ 0, ϕα is convex if α ≤ γ,
which does not hold when α > 0. The following example shows a case in which ϕα
is not convex for any α > 0, while it is convex for some negative values of α.
Example 7 Consider n = 1, f(x, y) = (−x + 2y + 1)(y − x) and C = [0,+∞):
f(x, ·) is τ -convex with τ = 4, thus ϕα is a gap function for any α ≥ −4. Moreover,
it holds
ϕα(x) = (−1− α/2)x2 + x
9
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for α ∈ [−4,−3], while
ϕα(x) =
(−1− α/2)x
2 + x, if x ∈ [0, (3 + α)−1) ,
(x+ 1)2/(8 + 2α), if x ∈ [(3 + α)−1,+∞) ,
for α > −3. Therefore, ϕα is convex on C for any α ∈ [−4,−2], while it is not
convex on C if α > −2. Indeed, f(·, y) is γ-concave with γ = −2 for any y ∈ C.
Under suitable convexity/concavity assumptions, any stationary point of the
gap function ϕα is not just a global minimum, which is already guaranteed by
Theorem 3.5 d), but also a solution of (EP ).
Theorem 3.6 Suppose that C ⊆ Rn is a nonempty, closed and convex set, f :
Rn × Rn → R satisfies f(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ Rn, there exist τ ≥ 0 and γ > −τ
such that f(x, ·) is τ -convex for any x ∈ C and f(·, y) is γ-concave for any y ∈ C.
Then the following statements hold for any α ∈ (−τ, γ]:
a) if x ∈ C does not solve (EP ), then
ϕ′α(x; yα(x)− x) ≤ −(τ + γ) ‖yα(x)− x‖2/2 < 0,
where ϕ′α(x; yα(x) − x) denotes the directional derivative of ϕα at x in the
direction yα(x)− x;
b) x∗ ∈ C solves (EP ) if and only if x∗ is a stationary point of ϕα over C, i.e.,
ϕ′α(x
∗; y − x∗) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ C.
Proof.
a) If x ∈ C does not solve (EP ), then yα(x) 6= x (see, for instance, [11, Proposition
3.1]). Proposition 2.1 guarantees that fα(x, ·) is (τ + α)-convex for any x ∈ C and
fα(·, y) is (γ − α)-concave for any y ∈ C. Then, the following chain of inequalities
and equalities holds:
ϕ′α(x; yα(x)− x) = (−fα(·, yα(x)))′(x; yα(x)− x)
≤ −fα(yα(x), yα(x)) + fα(x, yα(x))− (γ − α) ‖yα(x)− x‖2/2
= f(x, yα(x))− (γ − 2α) ‖yα(x)− x‖2/2
≤ f(x, x)− (f(x, ·))′(yα(x);x− yα(x))− τ ‖yα(x)− x‖2/2
−(γ − 2α) ‖yα(x)− x‖2/2
= −(f(x, ·))′(yα(x);x− yα(x)) + α ‖yα(x)− x‖2
−(τ + γ) ‖yα(x)− x‖2/2
≤ −(τ + γ) ‖yα(x)− x‖2/2,
where the first equality follows from the Danskin’s theorem [40], the first two in-
equalities from Theorem 6.1.2 in [41] since−fα(·, yα(x)) is (γ−α)-convex and f(x, ·)
is τ -convex, and the last inequality is due to the first-order optimality conditions
for yα(x).
b) If x∗ ∈ C solves (EP ), then it is a minimizer of ϕα over C by Theorem 3.5 a):
hence, it is a stationary point of ϕα over C. Conversely, if x
∗ is a stationary point
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of ϕα over C, then ϕ
′
α(x
∗; yα(x∗)−x∗) ≥ 0 and a) implies that x∗ solves (EP ).
Theorem 3.6 suggests the basic idea for a descent method for solving (EP )
through the minimization of the gap function ϕα: at each iteration a line search
along the descent direction yα(x) − x can be performed in order to decrease the
value of ϕα. While methods of this kind have been extensively developed under
monotonicity assumptions on f (see, for instance, [13]), the case of convex-concave
bifunctions has not received comparable attention yet.
Theorems 3.5 and 3.6 allow achieving the existence of a unique solution of (EP )
under suitable convexity-concavity assumptions.
Corollary 3.7 (Existence of a unique solution).
Suppose that C ⊆ Rn is a nonempty, closed and convex set, f : Rn × Rn → R
satisfies f(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ Rn, there exist τ ≥ 0 and γ > −τ such that f(x, ·)
is τ -convex for any x ∈ C and f(·, y) is γ-concave for any y ∈ C. Then, there
exists a unique solution of (EP ).
Proof. If α ∈ (−τ, γ), then Theorem 3.5 guarantees that ϕα is a strongly convex
gap function, hence it has a unique stationary point over C. Therefore, there exists
a unique solution of (EP ) by Theorem 3.6 b).
If f is strongly monotone on C, the gap function ϕα provides an error bound
for (EP ) whenever α > 0 is small enough (see [11, Proposition 4.2]). If f(x, ·)
is τ -convex for any x ∈ C for some τ > 0, then the use of negative values for
α brings further improvements: error bounds can be established even under weak
monotonicity or weak concavity assumptions.
Theorem 3.8 (Error bound).
Suppose that C ⊆ Rn is a nonempty, closed and convex set, f : Rn × Rn → R
satisfies f(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ Rn and there exists τ ≥ 0 such that f(x, ·) is
τ -convex for any x ∈ C.
a) If f is µ-monotone on C with µ > −τ and α ∈ [−τ, µ), then
ϕα(x) ≥ (µ− α) ‖x− x∗‖2, ∀ x ∈ C,
where x∗ is the unique solution of (EP).
b) If f(·, y) is γ-concave on C for any y ∈ C with γ > −τ and α ∈ [−τ, γ), then
ϕα(x) ≥ (γ − α)‖x− x∗‖2/2, ∀ x ∈ C,
where x∗ is the unique solution of (EP).
Proof.
a) By Corollary 3.4 a) there exists a unique solution x∗ of (EP ). Since Corollary 3.3
guarantees the equivalence between (EP ) and (EPα), x
∗ solves (EPα) as well.
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Therefore, any x ∈ C satisfies
ϕα(x) ≥ −fα(x, x∗)
= −fα(x, x∗)− fα(x∗, x) + fα(x∗, x)
≥ −fα(x, x∗)− fα(x∗, x)
≥ (µ− α) ‖x− x∗‖2,
where the last inequality holds since fα is (µ−α)-monotone on C by Proposition 2.1.
b) By Corollary 3.7 there exists a unique solution x∗ of (EP ) and it minimizes ϕα
over C by Theorem 3.5 a). Furthermore, ϕα is strongly convex on C by Theorem 3.5
d). Therefore, Theorem 6.1.2 in [41] guarantees that the inequality
ϕα(x) ≥ ϕα(x∗) + 〈g∗, x− x∗〉+ (γ − α)‖x− x∗‖2/2
holds for any x ∈ C and any g∗ ∈ ∂ϕα(x∗). The optimality of x∗ implies ϕα(x∗) = 0
and the existence of some g∗ ∈ ∂ϕα(x∗) such that 〈g∗, x− x∗〉 ≥ 0 for any x ∈ C.
Therefore, the conclusion follows.
Theorem 3.8 a) with τ = 0 and µ > 0 has been proved for variational inequalities
in [42] and extended to equilibrium problems in [11]. If τ > 0, then the above result
provides new error bounds under weaker assumptions than the usual ones.
In the case of linear equilibrium problems, that is when f is given by (1), f is
µ-monotone and f(·, y) is γ-concave and the moduli of monotonicity and concavity
are explicitly known: µ and γ are the minimum eigenvalues of (P−Q+(P−Q)T )/2
and P+P T , respectively. As τ is the minimum eigenvalue of Q+QT , the inequality
γ ≥ τ + 2µ always holds as well.
4. Minty auxiliary problems
The Minty equilibrium problem (MEPα) with α = 0 has been extensively used as
an auxiliary problem for (EP ) both in order to obtain existence results (see, for
instance, [17–20]) and within algorithmic frameworks (see, for instance, [21–25]).
On the contrary, the class of problems (MEPα) has been explicitly considered only
for variational inequalities with α < 0 in [6, 26], indirectly through gap functions
with α > 0 in [27, 28] and very recently in [29] to refine some existence results for
equilibrium problems.
The next two results provide the relationships between S(f) and the solution set
Mα(f) of (MEPα) for any value of α.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose that f : Rn × Rn → R satisfies f(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ Rn
and C ⊆ Rn is a nonempty, closed and convex set. Then Mα(f) ⊆ S(f) if any of
the following sets of conditions holds:
a) f(x, ·) is explicitly quasiconvex for any x ∈ C, f(·, y) is upper hemicontinuous
for any y ∈ C and α ≥ 0;
b) f(x, ·) is convex for any x ∈ C, f(·, y) is upper hemicontinuous for any y ∈ C
and α ∈ R.
Proof.
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a) Theorem 1 in [29] guarantees M0(f) ⊆ S(f). Since Mα(f) ⊆ M0(f) holds for
any α ≥ 0, the thesis follows.
b) Let x∗ ∈ Mα(f). Given any y ∈ C, consider the point yt = t y + (1 − t)x∗ for
t ∈ (0, 1) so that yt ∈ C. The following chain of inequalities holds
0 = f(yt, yt)
≤ t f(yt, y) + (1− t) f(yt, x∗)
≤ t f(yt, y)− α (1− t) ‖yt − x∗‖2/2
= t f(yt, y)− α t2(1− t) ‖y − x∗‖2/2.
The first is due to the convexity of f(yt, ·) while the second holds since x∗ ∈Mα(f).
As a consequence, the inequality
f(yt, y) ≥ α t(1− t) ‖y − x∗‖2/2
holds as well. Taking the limit as t ↓ 0, the upper hemicontinuity of f(·, y) guar-
antees f(x∗, y) ≥ 0. Hence, x∗ ∈ S(f).
If α = 0, then Theorem 4.1 collapses into Lemma 2.1 in [18]. Moreover, the as-
sumptions of Theorem 4.1 b) could be slightly weakened supposing f to be explic-
itly quasiconvex with respect to the second variable together with the α-upper sign
property with respect to the first variable (see [29]). However, notice that explicit
quasiconvexity of f(x, ·) alone is not sufficient to guarantee that Mα(f) ⊆ S(f)
holds for negative values of α, as the following example shows.
Example 8 Consider n = 1, f(x, y) = y3 − x3, C = [−ε,+∞) with ε > 0 and
α ≤ −2 ε. Given any x ∈ C, the function f(x, ·) is explicitly quasiconvex but not
convex. Furthermore, x = 0 solves (MEPα) since
fα(x, 0) = −x3 + αx2/2 ≤ 0, ∀ x ∈ C.
However, it does not solve (EP ) since
f(0, y) = y3 < 0, ∀ y < 0.
Therefore, the inclusion Mα(f) ⊆ S(f) does not hold. Notice that S(f) is nonempty
since x = −ε solves (EP ):
f(−ε, y) = y3 + ε3 ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ C.
The opposite inclusion of Theorem 4.1 requires suitable monotonicity or concav-
ity assumptions.
Theorem 4.2 Suppose that f : Rn × Rn → R satisfies f(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ Rn
and C ⊆ Rn is a nonempty, closed and convex set. Then S(f) ⊆ Mα(f) if any of
the following sets of conditions holds:
a) f is µ-pseudomonotone on C with 2µ ≥ α;
b) f is µ-monotone on C, f(x, ·) is τ -convex for any x ∈ C with τ ≥ 0 and
2µ+ τ ≥ α;
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c) f(x, ·) is lower hemicontinuous for any x ∈ C and fγ(·, y) is explicitly quasi-
concave for any y ∈ C with γ ≥ 0 and γ ≥ α;
d) f(x, ·) is τ -convex for any x ∈ C with τ ≥ 0 and fγ(·, y) is explicitly quasi-
concave for any y ∈ C with γ ≥ −τ and γ ≥ α.
Proof. Consider any x∗ ∈ S(f).
a) Any y ∈ C satisfies
fα(y, x
∗) = f(y, x∗) + α‖y − x∗‖2/2 ≤ (α/2− µ) ‖y − x∗‖2 ≤ 0
where the first inequality follows from the µ-pseudomonotonicity of f .
b) Any y ∈ C satisfies
fα(y, x
∗) = f(y, x∗) + α‖y − x∗‖2/2
≤ −f(x∗, y) + (α/2− µ) ‖y − x∗‖2
≤ (α/2− µ− τ/2) ‖y − x∗‖2
≤ 0,
where the first inequality is due to the µ-monotonicity of f while the second holds
since x∗ solves (EP−τ ) by Theorem 3.3 and therefore f(x∗, y) ≥ τ‖y − x∗‖2/2.
c) The bifunction gˆ(x, y) := −fγ(y, x) satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 1
in [29]. Hence, the following chain of inclusions holds:
S(f) ⊆ Sγ(f) = M0(gˆ) ⊆ S(gˆ) = Mγ(f) ⊆Mα(f).
d) Same as c) just noting that S(f) = Sγ(f) by Corollary 3.3.
Theorem 4.2 subsumes some known particular cases together with new results.
Case a) with µ = 0 and α = 0 together with Theorem 4.1 is the well-known
Minty Lemma about the equivalence between (EP ) e (MEP0) (see, for instance,
[17, 20]). Case b) with τ = 0, µ > 0 and α = 0 or α = µ was considered in [27].
Considering just variational inequalities, case a) with µ = 0 and α ≤ 0 has been
proved in [6, 26], while case b) with µ > 0 and α ≥ 0 in [28, Lemma 2.3]. To the
best of our knowledge, up to now cases c) and d) have not been considered in any
framework. Notice that the explicit quasiconcavity of fγ(·, y) is satisfied if f(·, y) is
γ-concave. Since parameters µ and γ can be negative, Theorem 4.2 provides results
that may just require weak pseudomonotonicity or weak concavity assumptions.
A Minty auxiliary problem principle, i.e. S(f) = Mα(f), can be obtained com-
bining Theorems 4.1 and 4.2. Notice that this auxiliary principle and Corollary 3.3
are somehow symmetric: the former requires α to be bounded by above and some
monotonicity conditions while the latter needs α to be bounded by below.
As (MEP0) has been widely used to obtain existence results for (EP ), the aux-
iliary problem (MEPα) can be exploited in the same fashion of [29]. Indeed, the
Minty auxiliary problem principle given by Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 can be exploited
to guarantee the existence of a unique solution for (EP ).
Corollary 4.3 (Existence of a unique solution).
Suppose that C ⊆ Rn is a nonempty, closed and convex set, f : Rn × Rn → R
satisfies f(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ Rn, there exists τ ≥ 0 such that f(x, ·) is τ -convex
for any x ∈ C and there exists γ > −τ such that fγ(·, y) is explicitly quasiconcave
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and upper hemicontinuous for any y ∈ C. Then there exists a unique solution of
(EP ).
Proof. Exploiting Theorem 4.1, Theorem 4.2 d), S(f) = Mγ(f) follows. Hence, it
is enough to prove that there exists a unique solution of (MEPγ).
Suppose x∗ solves (MEPγ). By Theorem 4.1 x∗ solves also (EPγ), that is
fγ(x
∗, y) ≥ 0 for any y ∈ C. Since fγ(x∗, ·) is strongly convex (see Proposition 2.1)
and fγ(x
∗, x∗) = 0, any y ∈ C with y 6= x∗ satisfies fγ(x∗, y) > 0 and thus it does
not solve (MEPγ). Therefore, the solution of (MEPγ), if any exists, is unique.
Considering the set-valued map M(x) := {y ∈ C : fγ(x, y) ≤ 0}, x∗ ∈ C solves
(MEPγ) if and only if x
∗ ∈ M(x) for any x ∈ C. Therefore, it is enough to prove
that the intersection of the sets M(x) over all x ∈ C is nonempty.
Given any x ∈ C, M(x) is nonempty, closed and bounded since x ∈ M(x)
and fγ(x, ·) is strongly convex. Therefore, the Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz
Theorem [43] guarantees the desired nonemptiness if
z :=
k∑
i=1
βix
i ∈
k⋃
i=1
M(xi) (2)
holds for any x1, . . . , xk ∈ C and any β1, . . . , βk ≥ 0 such that β1 + · · ·+βk = 1. By
contradiction, suppose z /∈M(xi) for any i. Then, fγ(xi, z) > 0 holds for any i, and
hence the quasiconcavity of fγ(·, z) implies the contradiction 0 = fγ(z, z) > 0.
Notice that the exploitation of the Minty auxiliary problem (MEPγ) in the proof
of Corollary 4.3 allows achieving the existence of a unique solution for (EP ) under
weaker assumptions than Corollary 3.7, which is based on the classical auxiliary
problem principle.
4.1. Minty gap functions
In the same way gap functions for (EP ) can be introduced through (EPα), the
auxiliary problem (MEPα) can be exploited to introduce another family of gap
functions. Indeed, the parallel treatment of gap functions for Minty formulations
provides new insights on the classical equilibrium problem (EP ) as well: further
solution methods and error bounds can be developed under suitable assumptions
that guarantee that Minty equilibria are solution of (EP ) (see Theorem 4.1). In
details, the function
ψα(x) := sup{ fα(y, x) : y ∈ C }
is non-negative on C and x∗ solves (MEPα) if and only if x∗ ∈ C and ψα(x∗) = 0.
Therefore, ψα is a gap function for (EP ) whenever S(f) = Mα(f) (see Theorems 4.1
and 4.2). Moreover, unlike the gap function ϕα of the previous section, it is always
convex provided that fα(x, ·) is convex and this property makes it attractive: in
fact, it has been exploited in algorithmic frameworks for variational inequalities [6,
21, 23, 26] and for more general equilibrium problems [24, 27].
The following result groups its main properties.
Theorem 4.4 (Properties of ψα).
Suppose that C ⊆ Rn is a nonempty, closed and convex set and f : Rn × Rn → R
satisfies f(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ Rn.
15
July 19, 2016 Optimization Bigi-Passacantando-revision2
a) ψα is a gap function for (EP) if S(f) = Mα(f);
b) ψα(x) < +∞ for any x ∈ C if any of the following conditions holds:
b1) f(·, y) is γ-concave on C for any y ∈ C and α < γ,
b2) there exists τ ∈ R such that f(x, ·) is τ -convex on C for any x ∈ C, f
is µ-monotone on C and α < 2µ+ τ .
c) If there exists τ ∈ R such that f(x, ·) is τ -convex on C for any x ∈ C, then
ψα is (τ + α)-convex on C for any α ∈ R.
Proof.
a) Obvious.
b1) Proposition 2.1 guarantees that fα(·, x) is (γ−α)-concave for any x ∈ C. Since
γ > α, fα(·, x) is strongly concave, thus its maximum value over C, that is ψα(x),
is finite.
b2) The µ-monotonicity of f implies
fα(y, x) ≤ −f(x, y) + (α/2− µ) ‖y − x‖2 = −f2µ−α(x, y).
Proposition 2.1 guarantees that f2µ−α(x, ·) is (τ + 2µ − α)-convex, hence
−f2µ−α(x, ·) is (τ + 2µ − α)-concave. Since τ + 2µ > α, it is actually strongly
concave and thus its maximum value over C is finite, which implies that ψα(x) is
finite as well.
c) Since α ‖y − x‖2/2 is α-convex with respect to x for any y ∈ C, fα(y, ·) is
(τ + α)-convex by Proposition 2.1. As it is the pointwise supremum of a family of
(τ + α)-convex functions, the gap function ψα is (τ + α)-convex as well (see [30,
Proposition 4.1]).
Theorem 4.4 a) has been already given in [6, 26–28] for the same particular cases
of Theorem 4.2 that have been previously recalled.
Notice that Theorem 3.5 and Theorem 4.4 are somehow symmetric: considering
any α > −τ , ϕα is a finite gap function for (EP ) but it is convex only under
additional assumptions, while ψα is always convex but it is a finite gap function
for (EP ) only under additional assumptions; moreover, γ-concavity provides a
common assumption to get convexity in Theorem 3.5 and finiteness in Theorem 4.4.
A result similar to Theorem 3.6 can be proved for the gap function ψα as well.
Theorem 4.5 Suppose that C ⊆ Rn is a nonempty, closed and convex set, f :
Rn×Rn → R satisfies f(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ Rn and there exist τ ≥ 0 and γ > −τ
such that f(x, ·) is τ -convex for any x ∈ C and f(·, y) is γ-concave for any y ∈ C.
Then, the following statements hold for any α ∈ [−τ, γ):
a) if x ∈ C does not solve (EP ), then
ψ′α(x; zα(x)− x) ≤ −(τ + γ) ‖zα(x)− x‖2/2 < 0,
where zα(x) := arg max{ fα(y, x) : y ∈ C };
b) x∗ ∈ C solves (EP ) if and only if x∗ is a stationary point of ψα over C, i.e.,
ψ′α(x
∗; y − x∗) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ C.
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Proof.
a) Proposition 2.1 guarantees that fα(y, ·) is (τ + α)-convex for any y ∈ C and
fα(·, x) is (γ − α)-concave for any x ∈ C. Since α < γ, there exists a unique
maximizer of fα(·, x) over C, and thus zα(x) is well defined for any x ∈ C.
Theorem 4.4 implies that ψα is a gap function for (EP ). As a consequence,
zα(x) 6= x since x does not solve (EP ). Finally, the following chain of inequalities
and equalities holds:
ψ′α(x; zα(x)− x) = (fα(zα(x), ·))′(x; zα(x)− x)
≤ fα(zα(x), zα(x))− fα(zα(x), x)− (τ + α) ‖zα(x)− x‖2/2
= −f(zα(x), x)− (τ + 2α) ‖zα(x)− x‖2/2
≤ −f(x, x) + (f(·, x))′(zα(x);x− zα(x))− γ ‖zα(x)− x‖2/2
−(τ + 2α) ‖zα(x)− x‖2/2
= (f(·, x))′(zα(x);x− zα(x))− α ‖zα(x)− x‖2
−(τ + γ) ‖zα(x)− x‖2/2
≤ −(τ + γ) ‖zα(x)− x‖2/2,
where the first equality follows from the Danskin’s theorem [40], the first two
inequalities from Theorem 6.1.2 in [41] since fα(zα(x), ·) is (τ + α)-convex and
f(·, x) is γ-concave, and the last inequality is due to the first-order optimality
conditions for zα(x).
b) If x∗ ∈ C solves (EP ), then it is a minimizer of ψα over C by Theorem 4.4 a):
hence, it is a stationary point of ψα over C. Conversely, if x
∗ is a stationary point
of ψα over C, then ψ
′
α(x
∗; zα(x∗)−x∗) ≥ 0 and a) implies that x∗ solves (EP ).
Also the gap function ψα can be exploited to obtain error bounds for (EP ). Since
it is always convex whenever fα(x, ·) is convex, some bounds can be achieved also
under pseudomonotonicity assumptions.
Theorem 4.6 (Error bound).
Suppose that C ⊆ Rn is a nonempty, closed and convex set, f : Rn × Rn → R
satisfies f(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ Rn and there exists τ ≥ 0 such that f(x, ·) is
τ -convex on C for any x ∈ C. If any of the following conditions holds:
a) f is µ-pseudomonotone on C with µ > −τ/2 and α ∈ (−τ, 2µ],
b) f is µ-monotone on C with µ > −τ and α ∈ (−τ, 2µ+ τ ],
c) fγ(·, y) is explicitly quasiconcave and upper hemicontinuous on C for any
y ∈ C with γ > −τ and α ∈ (−τ, γ],
then
ψα(x) ≥ (τ + α)‖x− x∗‖2/2, ∀ x ∈ C,
where x∗ is the unique solution of (EP ).
Proof. In case c) the existence of a unique solution x∗ of (EP ) is guaranteed by
Corollary 4.3. In the cases a) and b) it is guaranteed by Proposition 2.1 in [35] if
τ = 0 and by Corollary 3.4 if τ > 0.
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Any x ∈ C satisfies
ψα(x) ≥ fα(x∗, x) = f(x∗, x) + α‖x− x∗‖2/2 ≥ (τ + α)‖x− x∗‖2/2,
where the second inequality holds since x∗ solves (EP−τ ) by Theorem 3.2 and
therefore f(x∗, x) ≥ τ‖x− x∗‖2/2.
Theorem 4.6 b) with τ = 0 and µ > 0 has been proved for variational inequalities
in [28, Lemma 4.2], while all the other cases are, to the best of our knowledge, new.
Notice that the use of negative values for α (which is possible if τ > 0) provides error
bounds also under weak (pseudo)monotonicity or weak concavity assumptions.
5. Conclusions
The paper investigates in depth the relations of the equilibrium problem (EP )
with two different families of auxiliary problems: classical auxiliary problems (EPα)
and Minty auxiliary problems (MEPα), which both depend upon a regularization
parameter α.
Exploiting parametric definitions of strong/weak convexity and monotonicity,
results are presented in a unified form that allows subsuming known particular cases
together with new results. Indeed, the results require precise relations between α
and the moduli of monotonicity and convexity/concavity.
This kind of analysis has been the key tool for improvements by investigating
auxiliary problem principles both for positive and negative values of α. The equiva-
lence between (EP ) and (EPα) was already well-known for α > 0, yet the analysis
for negative values is new, while the equivalence between (EP ) and (MEPα) was
already well-known just for α = 0 in the pseudomonotone case.
These principles lead to new results on the existence of a unique solution for
(EP ) under weak quasimonotonicity or weak concavity assumptions. Furthermore,
the auxiliary problems (EPα) and (MEPα) with suitable choices of α bring in gap
functions ϕα and ψα with good convexity properties. New error bounds follow too,
which could be exploited in the analysis of quantitative stability of equilibria under
perturbations (see, for instance, [44, 45]).
Table 2 provides an overview of the monotonicity or concavity conditions that
guarantee the properties of the gap functions and the corresponding error bounds.
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Table 2. Conditions that guarantee properties of the gap functions ϕα and ψα supposing f(x, ·) τ -
convex with τ ≥ 0 and f(·, y) upper hemicontinuous
ϕα ψα
f µ-pseudomonotone, α ≤ 2µ
or
gap function α ≥ −τ f µ-monotone, α ≤ 2µ+ τ
or
fγ(·, y) explicitly quasiconcave, γ ≥ max{−τ, α}
convex f(·, y) γ-concave, α ≤ γ α ≥ −τ
strongly convex f(·, y) γ-concave, α < γ α > −τ
f µ-pseudomonotone, α ∈ (−τ, 2µ]
f is µ-monotone, α ∈ [−τ, µ) or
error bound or f µ-monotone, α ∈ (−τ, 2µ+ τ ]
f(·, y) γ-concave, α ∈ [−τ, γ) or
fγ(·, y) explicitly quasiconcave, α ∈ (−τ, γ]
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